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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 940334-CA 
SCOTT CARVER, : Category No. 3 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE SCOTT CARVER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of 
the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (g) 
(1994) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Richard Dee Thomas has not marshaled the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact and this Court should 
therefore assume that the record supports such findings and affirm 
the same. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court should survey the record in 
the light most favorable to the trial court's findings of fact and 
only reverse if there is no reasonable basis therein to support the 
trial court's findings. Northern v. Barnes, 870 P.2d 914, 915 
(Utah 1994). 
2. The Board of Pardon's decisions concerning petitioner were not 
arbitrary or capricious, did not subject petitioner to double 
jeopardy, and it was the Board, and not the sentencing court, that 
had authority to determine whether or not to grant petitioner 
credit for time served prior to conviction. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue presents only a question of 
law which this Court reviews for correctness giving no deference to 
the trial court. Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945 
(Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Respondent-Appellee submits that there are no determinative 
statutes and rules in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Richard Dee Thomas, an inmate incarcerated at the Utah State 
Prison, filed this action for an extraordinary writ alleging that 
he had not been properly afforded credit for time served on a third 
degree felony conviction by the Board of Pardons. R. 4-8. The 
respondent, Scott Carver, filed an answer denying that petitioner's 
rights had been violated. R. 50-56. The writ was heard on May 12, 
1994 by the trial court, and the trial court verbally granted the 
respondent's motion to dismiss. R. 114. Petitioner's Notice of 
Appeal was filed with the trial court on May 24, 1994. R. 115A. 
Judge Michael R. Murphy's Final Order, including Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, was entered on June 2, 1994. R. 121-27. 
STATEMENT OP RELEVANT FACTS 
Richard Thomas has not sought to marshal any of the evidence, 
either that supporting the trial court's findings of fact, or that 
contrary to the trial court's findings. For this reason, the 
respondent-appellee submits the following Findings of Fact as 
entered by the trial court on June 2, 1994 as their statement of 
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Misdemeanor. The Board issued a new parole date for September 22, 
1992. 
On September 22, 1992, Petitioner paroled from the prison, but 
on October 6, 1992, the Board issued a warrant to detain him on 
allegations that he had again violated his parole agreement. He 
was arrested the day the warrant was issued. On January 6, 1993, 
Petitioner appeared before the Board for a parole revocation 
hearing to answer the allegations that he had violated his parole 
agreement. The hearing was conducted in accordance with R671 of 
the Utah Administrative Code (1993). Petitioner was present and 
represented by legal counsel. 
Petitioner pled not guilty to the following parole violation 
allegations: 1) having committed failed programming; 2) having 
failed urinalysis; and 3) having committed the crime of Possession 
of a Controlled Substance. The Board then continued the matter, 
setting an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes 
surrounding the parole violation allegations. 
On March 8, 1993, an evidentiary hearing was conducted by the 
Board in accordance with R671 of the Utah Administrative Code 
(1993). The Board received testimony and documentary evidence and 
heard argument from both Petitioner's counsel and the Department of 
Corrections. Based upon the evidence, the Board found that 
Petitioner had violated his parole agreement, and it revoked his 
parole. The Board then set a new parole date for April 13, 1993. 
Petitioner was given a written decision, including the Board's 
rationale. The Board also issued written findings and conclusions, 
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The Board answered Petitioner's petition, pursuant to this 
court's order, and it denied failing to give Petitioner credit for 
any time to which he is legally entitled. As calculated by the 
Board, Petitioner's sentences of imprisonment will not statutorily 
expire until after Petitioner's death, unless shortened by the 
Board.1 Furthermore, the records of the Board show that 
Petitioner's sentence in Case No. 881910631 expired on December 4, 
1993 (approximately five years from the date he was committed to 
the prison), and both parties agree that specific sentence has 
terminated. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Richard Dee Thomas is serving two consecutive five-to-life 
sentences. Petitioner presents sundry vague challenges to the 
Board of Pardons decisions concerning parole. Thomas has been 
paroled on several occasions, only to return to the prison with new 
criminal convictions. He is currently awaiting trial on a new 
first degree felony charge, and the Board is awaiting the trial in 
that matter to make its next parole determination concerning 
Thomas. 
Having failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings, Thomas cannot challenge the same and this Court 
should assume that the findings are supported by the record. 
The Board of Pardon's decisions on how much time the 
petitioner must serve on his two consecutive five-to-life sentences 
1
 Petitioner is serving two concurrent five-to-life sentences 
with a consecutive zero-to-five year sentence. 
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have not been arbitrary or capricious and the petitioner's writ was 
therefore properly denied. 
Thomas' claim that he was subjected to double jeopardy because 
the Board considered a new misdemeanor conviction in setting a new 
parole date is without merit. 
Thomas claims that he was not given credit for time served (on 
parole violation charges) towards a new third degree felony 
conviction. First, such argument is moot because the challenged 
sentence has already terminated. Second, the sentencing court's 
order that the Board of Pardons grant such credit was contrary to 
Utah law and ineffectual. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT - WHICH SHOULD THEREFORE BE 
ASSUMED SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
Other than his claims that the trial court erred as a matter 
of law, Richard Dee Thomas also makes one claim that the trial 
court's findings of fact are erroneous. Petitioner appears to 
claim that the findings of fact are wrong in holding that a 
challenged third degree felony sentence had expired as a factual 
matter and that Thomas was still serving two first degree felony 
sentences and a further, consecutive, third degree felony sentence. 
Thomas makes no statement of facts in his opening brief. He 
does not marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
Findings of Facts. Petitioner does not seek to show in any manner 
that the evidence in the record is insufficient to support the 
trial court's Findings of Fact. For this reason, this Court should 
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assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court. 
If a challenge is made to the findings, an 
appellant must marshal all evidence in favor 
of the facts as found by the trial court and 
then demonstrate that even viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings of fact. If the 
appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the 
appellate court assumes that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court and 
proceeds to the review of the accuracy of the 
lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law in the case. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 8.06 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
The unchallenged findings of fact show that petitioner is 
serving two concurrent sentences of five-to-life, and a third 
consecutive sentence of zero-to-five years. These findings are 
supported by the record.2 R. 125 and Defendant's Exhibit 1, at pp. 
2-4. While petitioner has received other convictions, some of 
which have since terminated, the fact that these three sentences 
are not terminated is undisputed. 
Petitioner's does not dispute these ongoing sentences that he 
is serving. Instead, petitioner claims that he was not given 
proper credit for time served on a further third degree felony 
conviction. Defendant's Exhibit 1, at p. 1. But the undisputed 
finding of fact is that Richard Dee Thomas has already finished 
serving the challenged sentence. R. 125. His current 
incarceration is independent of the challenged sentence that the 
2
 Indeed, the only error in the Findings of Fact of the trial 
court is that the two five-to-life sentences of the petitioner are 
to be served consecutively and not concurrently as stated by the 
trial court. Defendant's Exhibit 1 at p. 2. 
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parties agree has terminated. Thomas has not presented any 
evidence of record to show in any manner that the trial court's 
finding of fact concerning this question is in error. 
The undisputed findings of fact establish an ongoing pattern. 
Thomas has been paroled by the Utah Board of Pardons and Paroles on 
several occasions. Each of these paroles ended in petitioner being 
returned to parole pursuant to charges of parole violations. On 
many of these occasions, Thomas also received new criminal 
convictions. Indeed, Thomas is currently awaiting trial on a first 
degree felony charge arising from his most recent period on parole, 
from April 13, 1993 to July 1, 1993. R. 124. In no manner has 
petitioner sought to challenge the findings of the trial court 
concerning Thomas' record on parole, his parole violations, or his 
new criminal charges. 
Because petitioner has not marshaled the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings of fact, and has not shown how the 
evidence of record is insufficient to support the trial court's 
factual findings, including the finding that the challenged third 
degree felony conviction had terminated, this Court should assume 
"that the record supports the findings of the trial court" and 
proceed "to the review of the accuracy of the lower court's 
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." 
Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199. 
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II. THE DECISIONS OP THE UTAH STATE BOARD OF 
PARDONS AND PAROLE CONCERNING RICHARD DEE 
THOMAS HAVE NOT VIOLATED ANY CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT OP THE PETITIONER 
In Malek v. Sawava, 730 P.2d 629, 630 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court made it clear that an extraordinary writ is "not an 
available remedy in the absence of a claim of fundamental 
unfairness at trial or a substantial and prejudicial denial of 
constitutional rights." The trial court correctly determined that 
petitioner had failed to present such a claim. 
A. The Board's decisions concerning Thomas' parole status were 
neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
Thomas' claims all demonstrate a misunderstanding of Utah law. 
Petitioner does not seem to understand that he is still serving two 
life sentences and that the Utah Board of Pardons has discretion to 
require him to serve any or all of those sentences. Preece v. 
House, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 12 (Utah 1994). The fact that the 
Board has placed Thomas on parole on numerous occasions, and that 
petitioner has violated that trust on each occasion, supports the 
Boards current determination to keep Thomas incarcerated. The 
Board is not required to conform to the sentencing guidelines. Id. 
Utah's sentencing guidelines "used by the board of pardons do not 
have the force and effect of law." Id. Absent some other 
constitutional infirmity, the courts do not sit as a panel of 
review on the Board's function. Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 
869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994). "So long as the period of 
incarceration decided upon by the board of pardons falls within an 
inmate's applicable indeterminate range . . . then that decision, 
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absent unusual circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and capricious." 
Preece, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12. 
Petitioner errs in trying to equate Utah's sentencing 
guidelines (which are not binding) with the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. The two are not identical, nor are they similar. The 
Utah Supreme Court has already rejected, in Preece a claim that an 
inmate has a constitutional right of some kind to be treated in 
accordance to Utah's guidelines. Indeed, Preece involved another 
inmate serving two five-to-life sentences that the Board of Pardons 
determined should serve more time than called for by the 
guidelines. 
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioner's challenge to 
the Board of Pardon's decision concerning the length of time that 
petitioner must serve before he will once more placed on parole. 
There is nothing arbitrary and capricious about the board's 
decision to await the outcome of petitioner's trial on new first 
degree felony charges before determining what parole date, if any, 
to set. 
B. The Utah Board of Pardon's has not subjected the petitioner to 
double jeopardy. 
Mr. Thomas claims that the Utah State Board of Pardons erred 
in considering his conviction for a misdemeanor in determining 
Thomas' parole eligibility and setting a tentative parole date. 
Again, Thomas has erred as to Utah law. The Board of Pardons can 
consider allegations of misconduct even if the inmate has been 
found not guilty in a criminal proceeding in determining in an 
administrative parole revocation proceeding that the inmate had 
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committed the charged offenses. Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P. 2d 1336 
(Utah 1986) . The Board does not subject Thomas to double jeopardy 
when it simply takes into consideration a recent misdemeanor 
conviction, as well as any other recent misconduct, in determining 
petitioner's eligibility for parole. 
C. The Board of Pardons and not the sentencing court has authority 
to give credit for time served prior to conviction. 
It is undisputed that petitioner's sentence in Case No. 
881910631 (a conviction of a third degree felony) has terminated. 
But Richard Thomas claims that the Board of Pardons erred by not 
giving his credit for time served prior to conviction as ordered by 
the trial court. The first error in this argument is that the 
question is moot. Petitioner is not now serving this sentence, and 
the question of when this sentence expired is of only academic 
interest because the petitioner is still serving two life 
sentences. 
Even if this issue was not moot, petitioner has once again 
misunderstood Utah law. The sentencing court had no authority to 
order the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole to grant credit for time 
served prior to the conviction. In State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 
264 (Utah 1985) , the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that the 
Board of Pardons was vested with the power to grant or deny such 
credit. The only exception to this rule is where an indigent was 
subjected to pretrial incarceration because he or she was not able 
to post bail. State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1987). 
Where, as here, a parolee was reincarcerated on suspicion of parole 
violation, the Board of Pardons has the discretion to determine 
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whether or not to grant credit for the time so served, not the 
trial court. Rawlinas v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958, 960-62 (Utah App. 
1994); Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App. 1992), 
affld, 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1993); State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 737 
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207, 208-10 (Utah 
App. 1988) . 
The Board of Pardons, and not the sentencing court, had the 
authority to determine whether to grant credit for time served 
pending the outcome of petitioner's new criminal trial. The time 
served by the petitioner before his challenged new third degree 
felony conviction was properly considered as serving part of his 
two five-to-life sentences of which he was already convicted. The 
trial court could not order the Board to also give credit for this 
time on the new conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Thomas' petition for 
an extraordinary writ and its decision should therefore be 
affirmed. >^ 
Respectfully submitted this ^— / ^njay of January, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent-Appellee Scott Carver, postage 
prepaid, to the following on this the of January, 1995: 
Richard Dee Thomas 
Inmate No. 13260 
P. 0. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84 020 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
330 South 300 East, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2525 
Telephone: (801) 575-1600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, : FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS 
and FINAL ORDER 
Petitioner, : 
v. : 
Case No. 930907154 EC 
SCOTT CARVER, Warden, et a L , : 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Respondents. : 
This matter came before the Court on Thursday, May 12, 1994, 
at 9:15 a.m. to consider Respondents' motion to dismiss and the 
merits of Petitioner's petition for extraordinary relief. 
Petitioner was present and represented pro se and Lorenzo K. 
Miller, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the Utah 
Board of Pardons and Parole (hereinafter "Board11). The Court has 
thoroughly reviewed all memorandum, pleadings and supporting 
documents filed in this case, and having heard argument from the 
parties, issued its decision and judgment. Based upon the 
foregoing, the court now makes the following findings: 
RLE0II8TRJCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 1994 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
wt^CY^ Son IP 
DtputyOtrfc 
C0121 
Findings of Pact 
Petitioner Richard D. Thomas, an inmate lawfully incarcerated 
at the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, is serving several 
indeterminate sentences of imprisonment for crimes against the 
state, including Distributing (a third degree felony), Aggravated 
Robbery (a first degree felony), Aggravated Kidnapping (a first 
degree felony), and Attempted Escape (a third degree felony). 
Prior to the foregoing convictions, Petitioner was also serving 
indeterminate sentences for the crimes of Theft (a third degree 
felony) and Grand Larceny (a second degree felony). 
On February 20, 1974, Petitioner appeared before the Utah 
Board of Pardons for an original parole grant hearing, and the 
Board denied parole. Subsequently, the Board reheard Petitioner's 
case and granted him a parole date. Since that time, Petitioner 
has paroled from the prison on at least four separate occasions and 
he violated his parole agreement on each occasion. Afterwards, 
each of his paroles was revoked by the Board. 
On July 21, 1989, after the service of eight months on his 
sixth felony conviction in Case No. 881910631 and his fourth parole 
violation, Petitioner again appeared before the Board for a 
rehearing to determine whether another parole date would be given. 
At that time, the Board granted Petitioner the conditional parole 
date of May 26, 1992. However, on October 30, 1990, the Board 
2 
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rescinded that date based upon a new conviction for a Class A 
Misdemeanor. The Board issued a new parole date for September 22, 
1992. 
On September 22
 # 1992, Petitioner paroled from the prison, but 
on October 6, 1992, the Board issued a warrant to detain him on 
allegations that he had again violated his parole agreement. He 
was arrested the day the warrant was issued. On January 6, 1993, 
Petitioner appeared before the Board for a parole revocation 
hearing to answer the allegations that he had violated his parole 
agreement. The hearing was conducted in accordance with R671 of 
the Utah Administrative Code (1993). Petitioner was present and 
represented by legal counsel. 
Petitioner pled not guilty to the following parole violation 
allegations: 1) having committed failed programming; 2) having 
failed urinalysis; and 3) having committed the crime of Possession 
of a Controlled Substance. The Board then continued the matter, 
setting an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes 
surrounding the parole violation allegations. 
On March 8, 1993, an evidentiary hearing was conducted by the 
Board in accordance with R671 of the Utah Administrative Code 
(1993). The Board received testimony and documentary evidence and 
heard argument from both Petitioner's counsel and the Department of 
Corrections. Based upon the evidence, the Board found that 
3 
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Petitioner had violated his parole agreement, and it revoked his 
parole. The Board then set a new parole date for April 13, 1993. 
Petitioner was given a written decision, including the Board's 
rationale. The Board also issued written findings and conclusions, 
and provided those to Petitioner. 
On April 13, 1993, Petitioner paroled from the prison, but on 
June 18, 1993, the Board issued warrant for Petitioner arrest based 
upon allegations that he had again violated his parole agreement. 
He was arrested on that warrant on July 1, 1993, and returned to 
the prison to await a revocation proceedings in accordance with 
R671 of the Utah Administrative Code (1993). 
Subsequently, Petitioner was charged in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, with 
the use of a firearm. Petitioner appeared before the Board on 
September 8, 1993, for a parole revocation hearing to answer the 
allegations that he violated his parole agreement. At that time, 
the Board continued the hearing, in accordance with R671-505 of the 
Utah Administrative Code (1993), to await final disposition of the 
criminal charges. Apparently, Petitioner has pled not guilty to 
aggravated robbery, and the criminal case is scheduled to be tried 
on August 2, 1994, before the Third Judicial District Court, Case 
No. 931901914 FS. 
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On December 13, 1993, Petitioner filed the instant petition 
claiming that the Board has failed to credit him with time served. 
Petitioner did not identify the specific time for which he claims 
credit. Instead, he alleges that the Board is refusing to grant 
the credit that the "Sentencing Judge Richard Moffat, did do in 
(commitment), . . . " The Judgment and Commitment signed by Judge 
Moffat states that "Defendant is to receive credit for time served 
since returned." 
The Board answered Petitioner's petition, pursuant to this 
court's order, and it denied failing to give Petitioner credit for 
any time to which he is legally entitled. As calculated by the 
Board, Petitioner's sentences of imprisonment will not statutorily 
expire until after Petitioner's death, unless shortened by the 
Board.1 Furthermore, the records of the Board show that 
Petitioner's sentence in Case No. 881910631 expired on December 4, 
1993 (approximately five years from the date he was committed to 
the prison), and both parties agree that specific sentence has 
terminated. 
Having made the foregoing findings, the court makes the 
following conclusions: 
1
 Petitioner is serving two concurrent five-to-life sentences 
with a consecutive zero-to-five year sentence. 
5 
00125 
Conclusions of Law 
Petitioner's claims of double jeopardy and of credit for time 
served are without merit. As a result of Petitioner's November 22, 
1988 conviction, Judge Moffat ordered that Petitioner be given 
credit for time served awaiting resolution of that specific case. 
The court concludes, without determining the legality of that 
order, that it extended no further than granting credit against the 
specific prison term imposed in Case No. 881910631. The court also 
concludes that Petitioner's request for credit in that case is now 
moot since the sentence of imprisonment in Case No. 881910631 has 
already expired. 
The court has considered Petitioner's request to apply 
approximately thirty-nine (39) months of time served against 
Petitioner's two five-to-life prison sentences, and the court 
concludes that such a claim is also without merit. Granting 
Petitioner credit for time served in Case No. 881910631 would make 
an insignificant difference to Petitioner's actual prison term. 
Under Utah law, Petitioner's sentences will not statutorily expire 
until five years after his death. Thus, granting 39 months of 
credit would not change the actual time Petitioner spends 
incarcerated at the prison, a decision which is left to the Board's 
discretion in this case. 
6 
001 
Furthermore, the court concludes that even if granting credit 
would somehow make a difference in this case, the court has no 
legal authority to order the Board to grant the credit Petitioner 
requests. Accordingly, the court concludes that Petitioner has no 
legal basis for the relief he seeks, and thus his claims against 
the Board are without merit and should be dismissed as a matter of 
law. 
Having made the foregoing findings and conclusions, the court 
now makes the following Order: 
Order 
1. Petitioner's request for extraordinary relief is denied. 
2. Respondents' Motion for Judgment is granted. 
3. This action is dismissed with prejudice as a matter of 
law. 
DATED this g) day o f « j , 1994. 
BY THE COUja^.^ 
HONORABLE MICHAEL RJ 
Third Judicial District Court 
C0127 
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